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The threat of bioterrorism and the possibility of accidental release have spawned a growth of interest in
modeling the course of the release of a highly pathogenic agent. Studies focused on strategies to contain local
outbreaks after their detection show that timely interventions with vaccination and contact tracing are able
to halt transmission. However, such studies do not consider the effects of humanmobility patterns. Using a
large-scale structured metapopulation model to simulate the global spread of smallpox after an intentional
release event, we show that index cases and potential outbreaks can occur in different continents even before
the detection of the pathogen release. These results have two major implications: i) intentional release of a
highly pathogenic agent within a country will have global effects; ii) the release event may trigger outbreaks
in countries lacking the health infrastructure necessary for effective containment. The presented study
provides data with potential uses in defining contingency plans at the National and International level.
I
n recent years, public health officials have been increasingly alert to the possibility of biological weapon use
through an act of bioterrorism. Among potential pathogenic agents, smallpox poses one of the greatest risks.
While smallpox has been eradicated in 19801, many experts believe that smallpox virus could exist outside the
official institutes in theUS and Russia. The smallpox virus, which is called variolamajor, is highly pathogenic, and
its intentional release into a population that is now largely susceptible (no one is certain about the residual
protection of vaccination received over 30 years ago) can create a tremendous amount of social disruption and
fatality. The possibility of a bioterrorist attack with smallpox is extremely limited and hampered by difficulties in
using smallpox as a biological weapon; however, there is an obvious need for contingency planning and pre-
paration. From a different perspective, smallpox is also used as the paradigmatic highly pathogenic agent that
serves as a case study for the preparation of a bioterrorism event or a laboratory accident, as recently revamped by
the engineered H5N1 debate2.
One of the main challenges in modeling intentional smallpox release is the choice of key epidemiological
parameters and natural history of smallpox infection. The contagiousness of the disease in the present population,
the release method of the virus, and many options in public health response, such as ring and mass vaccination,
mobility restrictions create a wide range of scenarios for which it is crucial to develop epidemic models able to
gauge the actual threat of a smallpox bioterrorist attack. In recent years, several studies have focused on the study
of smallpox transmission and control in urban settings and at the level of individual countries. Differentmodeling
techniques3,4, ranging from compartmental models5–12 to highly detailed agent-based models13–15, generally agree
in concluding that case isolation and vaccination, if timely implemented, will be sufficient to halt the ongoing
transmission and contain the outbreak. All studies, however, consider the situation in which the public health
system is effectively implementing the containment policies and is in possession of vaccine stockpiles.While these
assumptions are likely to hold in many wealthy countries, it is hard to imagine the same coordination and
availability of stockpiles worldwide. Furthermore, smallpox has long incubation and prodromal periods that
can last more than two weeks. Finally, it is plausible that the correct diagnosis of smallpox cases will not be
immediate, as doctors would initially not consider this eventuality. It is thus likely that two to four weeks could
pass from the smallpox attack before a worldwide emergency is declared. This implies that during this time the
disease might spread to other countries by means of traveling people exposed to the virus16.
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The potential threat represented by the global effects of a targeted
smallpox release event has yet to be analyzed with the use of explicit
models. Here, building on previous work, we have developed a large-
scale structured metapopulation model that accurately describes the
worldwide spread of smallpox during the initial period of time
between the occurrence of the intentional virus release and its detec-
tion by health officials. Thus we focus here on the level of worldwide
diffusion of smallpox cases before any containment/mitigation pol-
icy can be implemented.
Smallpox’s natural history is generally subdivided into three dif-
ferent stages: Latent, Prodromal, and Rash1,17. Upon infection, indi-
viduals spend an extended period of at least Ld days incubating the
infection6,10 in the Latent compartment, after which they progress
with rate e into the prodromal state12,13,15,16,18–20. The Prodromal per-
iod, with an average duration of c21 days6,9,12,15,18–20, is characterized
by fever and flu-like symptoms before finally displaying the typical
liquid filled blisters that characterize smallpox rash. Rash typically
lasts Id days6,10 and is eventually followed by a late rash period15,20,
after which recovery/death at a rate of m occurs. The relative infec-
tiousness associated with the prodromal period and the different rash
stages changes considerably in the literature1,16,17. It is also plausible
to consider that the transmission potential of the virus may change
considerably because of the awareness of a smallpox outbreak.While
infectiousness may be very high in the Rash stage, it is much simpler
to detect and at least partially isolate those cases. Hospitalization of
undetected cases at the beginning of the outbreak may lead to large
transmissibility12,21,22, which is drastically reduced once the proper
health infrastructure is set up. In the following, we consider only the
earliest outbreak stages during which the public health system is
unaware of the virus spreading. The basic reproductive number R0,
gauging the transmissibility of the virus, is a parameter of the model
and acts on the transmissibility of the various stages of the disease.
We have considered, according to recent work12,13,15,23, that the
Prodromal period contributes 10% of the disease transmissibility
and that during the late rash period the infectiousness of individuals
is reduced by 90% because the severity of the disease leads to isolation
Figure 1 | Compartmental smallpoxmodel. Each susceptible individual in contact with an infectious case in Prodromal, Early Rash and Late Rash Stage,
contracts the infection at rate rbb, b and rbb, respectively. Newly infected individuals enter a latency period during which they are not infectious yet and
remain latent for aminimal duration of Ld days, after which they progress into the Prodromal Stage at per capita rate e. Individuals in prodromal stage are
divided between those who are able to travel, which occurs with probability pt, and those who are restricted from traveling. Prodromal Stage is
characterized by reduced infection transmissibility rbb andmean duration of c
21 days. A proportion pr of individuals at the end of Prodromal Stage with
traveling capability moves into Early Rash Stage to continue traveling while the rest – 1-pr – is withdrawn from traveling during this stage. Early Rash lasts
for Id days and is characterized by the highest transmissibility b of the virus. After Early Rash, infectious individuals proceed to Late Rash Stage during
which they are restricted from traveling and their transmissibility is reduced to rbb. This last stage of infection is followed by permanent recovery at rate m.
Table 1 | Compartmental smallpox model parameters. Model parameters used in the baseline scenario and sensitivity analysis (in brackets)
are reported
Initial conditions
Origin of pandemic London, England [New York, USA; Paris, France]
Release strategy 5 individuals in Prodromal stage avoiding detection
Virus release with 10 civilians in Latent stage
Outbreak detection
Upon detection of a cluster of 4 [2, 8] civilians in rash stage in a single country
Transmission dynamics
R0 Reproduction ratio 5 [3, 7]
1-rb Reduction in transmissibility of infection during prodromal and late rash periods 90%
Ld Minimal duration in latent stage 7 days
e21 Average latency period proceeding Ld 5 days
c21 Average period of prodromal stage 3 days
Id Duration in early rash stage 5 days
m21 Average period of late rash stage 7 days [3.6 days, 11 days]
1-s0 Prior immunity 0% [20%]
Impact of disease on individual behavior
pt Probability of traveling during prodromal stage 50%
pr Probability of traveling during early rash stage proceeding prodromal stage with traveling
capability
20% [10%, 30%]
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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and identification of the cases. A key feature of our model is the
mobility of individuals. It is therefore extremely important to assoc-
iate the different stages of the disease with different mobility and
travel capabilities. In particular, only a fraction pt of individuals in
the Prodromal period are allowed to travel. Prodromal individuals
capable of traveling are still allowed to travel with probability pr for Id
days upon their progression to the Rash stage12. They are then with-
drawn from the pool of mobile individuals13. The compartmental
structure of the model, which includes the mobility classes, is
reported in Fig. 1. In Table 1, we summarize the baseline parameters
used in the study and the ranges considered for the sensitivity ana-
lysis of the model. All values and ranges considered are based on an
extensive analysis of the literature and the parameters generally
adopted in major simulation studies. The transmission dynamics is
simulated with a multinomial stochastic transmission model and the
individuals’ mobility follows a stochastic dynamics too as detailed in
the online supplementary information.
Results
In order to model the spread of smallpox as occurring from an
intentional release in the environment, it is crucial to imagine dif-
ferent release events19 and initial locations22. Similar to previous
published studies, we consider two release scenarios. The first scen-
ario depicts the intentional release from 5 individuals who success-
fully infect themselves with the virus in a major Western metropolis.
These individuals move freely within the city (avoiding detection)
and expose civilians to infection until they are removed from the
population. The five individuals follow a deliberate release strategy
and do not attempt international travel in order to limit the possibil-
ity of detection. As well, they do not seek medical care. In the model
those agents follow just local mobility and keep on in transmitting
the disease till they enter the late rush compartment. A second release
event scenario deals with directly targeting the population. This can
easily result in several successful infections if it were attempted in a
context where tens of thousands of people are in close proximity.
However, given the quantities of aerosol that would be required and
the logistics necessary to distribute it to such large numbers while
avoiding detection, we believe that this would be extremely unlikely
and choose to focus on the more likely case of a small-scale initial
infection as done in previous studies3,10,11,13. In particular we consider
a case in which an aerosol version of the virus is dispersed in a closed
environment, successfully exposing just 10 civilians. The victims are
unaware that they have been exposed and continue to behave as they
normally would. It is important to stress that the stochastic dynamics
Figure 2 | Timeline of international smallpox spread. Top) Intentional spread by five individuals avoiding detection and medical care. Bottom)
Virus release with the exposure of 10 civilians. (A–B) Probability of observing an international outbreak (presence of cases outside the initial target
country) at the time of initial detection and the following three weeks. (C–D) Number of affected countries conditional to the international outbreak.
(E–F) Number of cases outside the target country conditional to global outbreak. Boxplots display the median, 50% and 95% reference ranges
from 5,000 simulated events with the baseline parameters of Table 1.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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of the model naturally takes into account the generation of infections
at different times and thus generates in each realization a varying
number of exposed and infected people during the period preceding
the detection of the outbreak by the health system. In both scenarios,
we consider London, UK as the target city. In the supplementary
information, we report results for other major locations in Europe
and the US.
The conditions for the detection from the public health commun-
ity of the intentional release are discussed in the methods sections. In
particular, we assumed that a minimum number of 4 infected cases
(sensitivity analysis between 2 and 8 cases) seek health care in the
rush stage. Before detection the world is totally unaware of the inten-
tional release, no containment/mitigation policy is therefore imple-
mented. We consider the moment of detection as the moment at
which, in the most optimistic scenario, the international community
can start working on issuing and implementing the containment/
mitigations contingency plans. This is a quite conservative assump-
tion as medical doctors would hardly consider smallpox as a possible
diagnosis until the onset of complications in the patients, and there-
fore it is likely that the disease detection would require several more
days to occur. Furthermore, the actual distribution of vaccine, imple-
mentation of travel restrictions, the organization of a coordinated
effort of international contact tracingmay require extra time. For this
reason we provide here snapshot of the worldwide impact of the
intentional release without considering mitigation/containment
policies at the time of detection, as well as after 1 to 3 weeks after
detection.
In Fig. 2 we report the number of countries affected and the small-
pox cases observed outside the targeted country for the baseline
transmission rate and for different delays after the initial outbreak
detection. It is possible to observe that even at the moment of detec-
tion of the small-scale outbreak, with R05 5, the 50% reference range
indicates that 2 to 4 countries have already imported at least one
exposed individual. This is also observed with the number of exposed
individuals dispersed in countries outside the target. The risk analysis
for each country is composed of two components: the probability
that a country will have at least one infected individual and the
expected number of infected cases conditional to this event. In order
to provide a global visualization of the risk worldwide, we provide
risk maps at the level of single census area. In Fig. 3 we show a
worldwide map that shows the probability of observing exposed
individuals at the detection and after two weeks from detection of
the release at the scale of the census area used in the numerical
simulation. The statistics are obtained by analyzing 5,000 different
stochastic realizations of the smallpox release with the same initial
conditions. It is also important to stress that the reported outbreak
probabilities refer to initial seeding events and small-scale outbreaks
that may ormay not lead to large-scale epidemics depending on local
containment policies. In each different realization however the num-
ber of cases is generally localized in specific census areas. For instance
Figure 3 | Worldwide location of risk areas in the case of the intentional release of smallpox virus in London. The upper map reports the probability of
observing exposed individuals at the time of detection and the lower map shows the same quantity two weeks from detection. The color code is in
logarithmic scale and the results are at the finer scale allowed by the numerical simulations that depending on the region of the world ranges from 25 to
200 km. Maps were generated using ArcGIS.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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if we consider Germany, we might observe a realization with 3 cases
in Frankfurt, while in a different realization we may have 4 cases in
Munich.
According to our statistical analysis, not only is the risk never
geographically restricted, even at the time of detection or just a week
later when the first coordinated interventions might be feasible (see
Figs. 2, 3), it also increases rapidly both in terms of exposure size and
probability. The reason for such a rapid international spread is due to
the fact that London serves as a major connecting point between the
various continents, with daily connections to other parts of Europe,
Africa, Asia, and the Americas. However, other major hubs in the
USA and Europe produce the same results, as shown in the supple-
mentary information. At the early stage of the epidemic the world-
wide exportation of cases from the target country can be assumed to
be a Poisson process, thus assuming independence of each event and
disregarding the possibility of cluster cases24–26. In this case the cumu-
lative probability distributionP(T) to have a first positive event in any
given country within time T, i.e., one infected individual traveling
from the initially targeted country, will be
P(T)~1{exp({
ðT
0
l(t)dt) ð1Þ
where l(t) is the rate of positive case importation. The rate l(t)
depends on the size of the outbreak in the initially targeted country
and the traveling rate of individuals, that is proportional to the pas-
senger traffic between the two countries v. In Figure 4 we show the
local outbreak/importation of cases probability as a function of the
daily passenger traffic of each country with the UK. At the time of
detection the two quantities exhibit a high level of correlation
(r.0.95, p,0.0001) and a roughly linear behavior. Indeed at the
early stage of the outbreak the number of exposed cases in the ini-
tially targeted country is very small and the exponential term in
Eq. (1) can be approximated as 1{
Ð T
0 l(t)dt, yielding a probability
of outbreak well approximated by a linear scaling with the passenger
traffic: P(T),v. After three weeks from the detection it is possible to
observe that the curve exhibits the exponential behavior of Eq. (1) as
a function of traffic (figure not shown). This non-linear behavior is
indeed at the origin of the inefficacy of travel restrictions in slowing
considerably the global spread of epidemics. Even severe travel
restrictions reducing traffic of 50% or more generally delay the
importation of cases of only two to three weeks at themost as already
pointed out in the literature24,27–29. However, in the case of a poten-
tially catastrophic event such as a smallpox large-scale outbreak,
drastic travel restrictions (to the extent of country isolation) may
be appropriate in the framework of an international containment
effort and deserve a separate careful study. This simple calculation
shows clearly that the key parameter in the risk assessment of each
country is the incoming traffic from the outbreak origin. A finer
analysis considering catchment areas of specific airports, and ground
transportation and commuting is however required to achieve pre-
cise estimate especially within countries.
So far in this discussion, we have ignored any possibility of residual
immunity from the global vaccination campaign that resulted in the
eradication of smallpox 30 years ago. Several authors20,30 have poin-
ted out that it is possible that asmuch as 20% of the global population
remains immune, even though the long term effects of the vaccine are
not well known. In order to test the effect of a residual immunity, we
also inspect scenarios that allow for 20% of the population to be
completely immune to contagion. Strikingly, we find that the overall
results do not change significantly. There are roughly 40% less total
cases, but they are still distributed across the globe, making a suc-
cessful containment of the disease a major challenge. Further
details and sensitivity analyses are presented in the supplementary
information.
Many elements of uncertainty, some on the positive and some on
the negative side, are present in the modeling assumption used in
assessing the level of threat of the international spread resulting from
the deliberate release of highly pathogenic virus. First of all, the
transmissibility of the virus has an obvious impact on the inter-
national spread. More accurate modeling of refined population
structure may enhance or hamper the international spreading
depending on the mobility habits of the infected individuals. We
do not include age structure or income differences in identifying
travelers. The model does not include cluster events in the importa-
tion of infectious individuals such as those that may occur in the
confined space of airplanes31. Similarly we do not include contact
structure and index case setting that may lead to super-spreading
event as observed for instance in the SARS epidemic32. It is clear,
however, that time is a crucial factor. At the moment of the initial
detection of an outbreak the number of infected individuals outside
the target country is relatively small. A very effective contact tracing
may lead to the timely identification and isolation of all cases before
they can trigger large-scale outbreaks. On the other hand, one to two
weeks of delay may lead to the impossibility of a 100% effective
contact tracing of more than 50 individuals. The next step is, there-
fore, the study of the effect of quarantine and other mitigation and
containment policies, especially in the event of outbreaks in less
developed countries, at the international level.
Discussion
The present work indicates that a deliberate smallpox release is likely
to assume an international dimension even before the epidemic is
identified. We show through large-scale individual-based simula-
tions that biological targeted attacks on a single city can result in
the presence of exposed individuals in several countries before the
health system is aware of the release and the ensuing outbreak. Some
of the countries that could be affected may not have health infra-
structures able to timely cope efficiently with the emergency dictated
Figure 4 | Probability of observing smallpox cases as a function of the
traffic from the targeted country. The plot shows that initially the case
importation/local outbreak probability in the top 20 countries at risk is
well approximated by a linear scaling (solid line) with the traffic from the
initially targeted country (high correlation coefficient r,with significant p-
value). The size of the data points corresponds to the total population of
the country. Data and scenarios are the same as reported in Table 2.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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by a highly pathogenic virus outbreak. These findings highlight the
presence of a systemic risk linked tomodern humanmobility that has
to be faced by developing new contingency plans that consider the
non-local dimension of epidemic spreading. The presented compu-
tational approach is a potential starting point for the definition of
optimized containment schemes and mitigation policies that
includes the international dimension of epidemics caused by highly
pathogenic viruses. For reasons related to dual-use risk of the results
contained in this paper, according to the comments of biosafety
reviewers, we have removed quantitative data on risk probability
and outbreak size in different scenarios. Those additional outputs
can be shared with government officials and biosecurity researchers
upon request.
Methods
GLobal epidemic and mobility model. We use the GLobal Epidemic and Mobility
(GLEaM) model24,33–38, which is based on a high definition geographically structured
metapopulation approach39,40. The model is composed of three layers. The first one,
the population layer, integrates distinct census areas for a total of 3,362
subpopulations in 220 countries around the world. For each subpopulation, the
number of individuals is obtained from ‘‘Gridded Population of theWorld,’’ a project
by Columbia University that provides population estimates worldwide for cells of 15
3 15 minutes of arc41. The second layer of the model contains information about
human mobility flows across the census areas. We consider both commuting flows,
which is collected from various sources37, and airline traffic worldwide, which is
provided by commercial databases42,43. Within each subpopulation, the infection
dynamics takes into account the natural history and key parameters through a
compartmental structure. The disease progression is simulated through a stochastic
chain binomial and multinomial model44,45. Finally, the transportation layer allows
for the detailed description of the mobility of exposed and infected individuals, thus
allowing the stochastic simulation of the worldwide unfolding of the epidemic.
Further details concerning the model are in the supplementary information and in
Refs 35, 37, 38. As we work with a fully stochastic model, we have considered, for each
considered scenario and parameters’ set, a total of 5,000 stochastic realizations. The
subpopulation structure covers explicitly almost 6 billion individuals with a time
resolution of one day. Each set of realizations produces 27 GigaBytes of data and runs
on 256 CPU cores.
Detection.What we are interested in is the quantitative assessment of the risk of the
internationalization of the epidemic and the number of countries involved. Clearly,
this risk assessment depends on the time elapsed from the biological attack. The point
of interest is therefore the time at which the international community is able to issue a
worldwide alert and start implementing containment and mitigation policies. This
includes the ability of an effective contact tracing, the deployment of vaccine
stockpiles for ring vaccination, travel restrictions, etc. Theoretically, the earliest time
at which the detection can occur is when the first person in the rash stage is correctly
diagnosed. Due to the current rarity of the disease and the difficult diagnostic, it is
likely that an alert will only be possible after several civilian cases have already
occurred. We assume that 4 individuals are required to enter the rash stage before
successful detection is feasible and an alert issued46–49 and make a sensitivity analysis
in the range of 2 to 8 individuals. We are, therefore, measuring the distribution of the
number of countries affected and the specific risk posed for each individual country at
detection time. In addition, from the successful detection of the smallpox outbreak to
the implementation of effective contact tracing and worldwide coordinated response,
including the deployment of a vaccine, most of the experts consider a time window
ranging from 1 to 4 weeks. For this reason, we report data also for the three
consecutive weeks (four consecutive weeks in the Supplementary Information)
following the initial outbreak detection.
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